Abrams Tanks Assigned Anti-Drone Role in New U.S. Army Tactical Manual

The U.S. Army introduced a significant doctrinal update that redefines the operational role of its M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks. According to the revised Tank Platoon Tactics Manual published by the Army Publishing Directorate, Abrams crews are now instructed to engage hostile drones using their 120mm main guns equipped with M1028 canister rounds. This development marks a tactical shift in response to the increasing prevalence of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) on the battlefield.

Abrams main battle tanks. General Dynamics

The M1028 canister round, originally designed for close-range anti-personnel use, disperses hundreds of tungsten balls upon firing, creating a wide-area shrapnel effect. This characteristic is now being repurposed to counter small drones, particularly quadcopters and reconnaissance UAVs that operate at low altitudes and pose threats to armored formations. The manual suggests supplementing the canister round with machine gun fire to establish a layered defense against aerial threats.

This doctrinal change reflects broader concerns about the limitations of the Army’s short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities. In operational theaters such as Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, drone swarms and loitering munitions have become increasingly common. These systems challenge traditional armored platforms, which were not originally designed to counter aerial threats. The adaptation of the Abrams tank for anti-drone roles underscores the Army’s recognition of this evolving threat landscape.

Historically, the Abrams had limited anti-air capabilities, such as the M830A1 HEAT-MP-T round with a proximity fuse. However, these munitions were not optimized for engaging agile, low-flying drones. The current approach, relying on manually aimed canister rounds, introduces new tactical considerations. The effectiveness of this method depends on factors such as terrain, visibility, and crew coordination. Unlike automated counter-UAV systems that use radar-guided interceptors, the Abrams’ method remains largely manual and reactive.

The shift also highlights the Army’s efforts to extend the relevance of legacy platforms while awaiting more advanced solutions. The M1A2 Abrams, despite its age, continues to receive upgrades through the System Enhancement Package (SEP) series. The latest SEPv3 variant includes features such as the Trophy Active Protection System (APS), improved sensors, and enhanced survivability. However, the Army has announced plans to transition to the M1E3 Abrams, which is expected to incorporate more integrated electronic warfare and counter-drone capabilities.

From a strategic perspective, the new doctrine serves as a stopgap measure. It does not involve new procurement contracts or hardware modifications but rather a redefinition of existing capabilities. General Dynamics, the manufacturer of the Abrams, remains the primary contractor, and modernization efforts continue through the M1E3 program. The use of M1028 rounds against drones is a cost-effective interim solution while more sophisticated systems are developed.

The decision to train tank crews for anti-drone engagements also raises questions about operational practicality. The Abrams’ main gun has limited elevation and traverse compared to dedicated anti-air platforms. Visual detection and manual targeting may be insufficient against fast-moving drones, especially in complex environments. This contrasts with systems like Israel’s Trophy, which offer autonomous threat detection and interception.

Another operational constraint in deploying the M1028 round for anti-drone purposes is the limited ammunition capacity of the M1A2 Abrams. A typical Abrams loadout prioritizes armor-piercing and high-explosive rounds, with only a small allocation for specialty munitions like the M1028. This restricts the number of canister rounds available during engagements, especially in prolonged operations where resupply may be delayed or logistically complex. Given that each M1028 round weighs over 22 kilograms and occupies significant space within the tank’s ammunition storage, commanders must balance its inclusion against other mission-critical munitions. This limitation could reduce the tank’s sustained effectiveness against drone swarms, which often require multiple rapid-response shots to neutralize.

Cost considerations further complicate the tactical viability of using M1028 rounds against drones. Each round is estimated to cost around $1,600, significantly more than many of the kamikaze FPV drones it is intended to counter. These drones, often assembled from commercial components, can cost as little as $300 to $500. The economic asymmetry means that adversaries can deploy large numbers of inexpensive drones, while U.S. forces must rely on relatively costly munitions to defend against them. This imbalance raises concerns about sustainability in high-intensity conflicts, where cost-per-kill metrics become increasingly relevant. While the M1028 offers a stopgap capability, its expense and limited availability underscore the need for more scalable and cost-effective counter-drone solutions.

The U.S. Army’s updated manual represents an adaptive response to the challenges posed by modern drone warfare. By repurposing existing munitions and platforms, the Army aims to mitigate vulnerabilities in its armored formations. The long-term effectiveness of this approach will depend on the integration of more advanced counter-UAV technologies and the continued evolution of armored doctrine in response to emerging threats.