The F-22 will be the first fighter jet to collaborate with a drone wingman: Evaluating Effectiveness and Challenges

F-22. AF.mil

The U.S. Air Force is advancing its integration of manned and unmanned aerial systems through the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) initiative, with the F-22 Raptor designated as the first operational fighter to control these autonomous drones. This development marks a significant shift in air combat strategy, emphasizing networked warfare and distributed capabilities.

According to the Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2026 budget proposal, the Crewed Platform Integration program will allocate approximately $15 million to equip 143 combat-capable F-22s with tablet-based control systems and supporting hardware for CCA operations. These modifications include tablets, cables, software updates, and communications integration, with each installation kit estimated at $86,218. The initiative aims to enable F-22 pilots to manage drone operations directly from the cockpit, using touch-based interfaces to issue commands and coordinate missions.

The CCA program itself is receiving substantial investment, with $870 million requested for continued development. Two prototype drones—General Atomics’ YFQ-42A and Anduril’s YFQ-44A—are currently in development under Increment 1. The Air Force plans to acquire between 100 and 150 of these initial CCAs, with a long-term goal of fielding at least 1,000 units across future increments. Operational deployment is targeted before the end of the decade.

The integration of CCAs with the F-22 is part of a broader strategy to enhance the capabilities of existing platforms while preparing for future systems like the sixth-generation F-47 fighter. The Air Force envisions CCAs operating alongside a variety of aircraft, including the F-35, B-21 Raider, and aerial refueling tankers. This approach reflects a shift toward modular, scalable force structures that can adapt to evolving threats and mission requirements.

Communication between F-22s and CCAs is expected to leverage the Inter-Flight Data Link (IFDL), a secure and resilient system already used among F-22s. Experiments with the XQ-58 Valkyrie drone have demonstrated potential for bridging data links between F-22s and F-35s, suggesting a path toward broader interoperability.

Despite the promise of tablet-based control systems, concerns remain about their practicality in high-intensity combat scenarios. Pilots have reported challenges in managing both their aircraft and drone operations simultaneously. These limitations have prompted exploration of alternative control architectures, including more integrated cockpit solutions and increased drone autonomy.

Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for both the F-22 and F-35, has showcased its piloted-drone teaming interface, which allows a single pilot to control multiple drones via touchscreen tablets. While this technology is seen as a rapid path to experimentation, it may not represent the final configuration for operational use. The Air Force continues to evaluate a spectrum of control options, balancing ease of integration with mission effectiveness.

To support testing and evaluation, the Air Force has established the Experimental Operations Unit (EOU), which recently expanded to a squadron-sized formation. The EOU is expected to receive additional CCAs for operational trials, although the specific models and quantities remain undisclosed. Concurrently, the Project VENOM initiative is modifying six F-16s to assist with autonomy testing, complementing efforts with the X-62A test jet.

The CCA program’s scale and ambition raise logistical and operational questions. Deploying, maintaining, and coordinating large numbers of autonomous drones will require new infrastructure, training protocols, and tactical doctrines. The Air Force is collaborating with the Navy and Marine Corps to develop a common command and control architecture, aiming for joint interoperability across services.

The decision to equip F-22 Raptors with CCA control capabilities represents a pivotal moment in the evolution of air combat. By pairing advanced manned fighters with autonomous systems, the Air Force seeks to extend the reach, survivability, and effectiveness of its aerial forces. While technical and operational challenges persist, ongoing experimentation and investment suggest a clear trajectory toward integrated manned-unmanned operations in future conflicts.

One of the emerging challenges in deploying unmanned wingmen within the Collaborative Combat Aircraft framework is the vulnerability of these systems to electronic warfare, particularly signal jamming. As adversaries increasingly invest in counter-drone technologies, the threat posed by radiofrequency and GNSS jammers becomes a critical consideration in operational planning. These jammers can disrupt the command and control (C2) links between the unmanned wingmen and their controlling platforms, as well as interfere with navigation systems reliant on satellite signals.

Signal jamming presents a dual-layered threat. First, by targeting the C2 link—typically operating in the 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz bands—adversaries can sever real-time communication between the drone and its operator. This disruption can force the drone into autonomous fallback modes, such as return-to-base protocols or loitering behavior, which may not align with mission objectives. Second, by spoofing or jamming GNSS signals, adversaries can compromise the drone’s positional awareness, leading to navigational errors or unintended flight paths. These effects are particularly pronounced in drones lacking robust anti-spoofing firmware or alternative navigation systems.

To mitigate these vulnerabilities, drone developers are incorporating counter-countermeasures such as frequency hopping, inertial navigation units, and terrain mapping. These technologies aim to preserve operational integrity in contested electromagnetic environments. However, the effectiveness of these measures varies depending on the sophistication of the jamming systems and the environmental conditions. For instance, high-powered jammers deployed on mobile platforms or integrated into armored vehicles can create wide-area denial zones, complicating drone operations across entire sectors.

The tactical implications of signal jamming extend beyond individual drone performance. In coordinated operations involving multiple unmanned wingmen, jamming can disrupt swarm behavior, degrade situational awareness, and fragment mission execution. This fragmentation undermines the core advantage of CCAs—distributed, synchronized action—and forces reliance on pre-programmed autonomy or fallback protocols. While autonomy offers resilience, it also limits adaptability, particularly in dynamic combat scenarios where real-time decision-making is essential.

Operational planners must also consider the logistical and strategic dimensions of electronic warfare. Deploying unmanned wingmen in environments saturated with jamming signals requires robust electronic support measures (ESM) to detect and characterize threats, as well as electronic countermeasures (ECM) to neutralize or evade them. These capabilities add complexity to mission planning and demand integration with broader joint force operations. The Air Force’s collaboration with the Navy and Marine Corps on common command and control architectures reflects an acknowledgment of these challenges and the need for interoperable solutions.

In future conflicts, the contest between drone capabilities and electronic defenses is likely to intensify. As adversaries refine their jamming techniques and expand their deployment of anti-drone systems, the survivability and effectiveness of unmanned wingmen will hinge on continued innovation in electronic resilience. This includes not only technical upgrades but also doctrinal shifts that emphasize flexibility, redundancy, and adaptive mission planning. The integration of CCAs with platforms like the F-22 represents a step toward this future, but the path forward will require sustained investment and iterative experimentation to ensure that unmanned systems remain viable assets in increasingly contested airspaces.